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In this note we construct a simple international differentiated duopoly model that involves a 
divisionalization decision. It will be shown that the number of third market divisions of a parent 
firm with a cost advantage is relatively large. The results imply that the cost competitiveness of 
one country’s firm will be magnified through divisionalization decisions. 
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1． Introduction 
 
Due to reductions in barriers to investment throughout the world, there has been a rapid increase in 
foreign direct investment (FDI).
4
 It has spurred a large body of literature examining the determinants 
and effects of FDI. In traditional FDI literature, it is argued that FDI is determined by firms to take 
advantage of various economic environments of the host market such as wage differentials, access to the 
market, and access to resources, etc.
5
 
In recent years, the role of retail and distribution facilities (i.e., ‘downstream divisions’) is 
emphasized in FDI activities. In particular, many firms have shifted those facilities to countries such as 
China and India because of growing demand in those countries. When FDI is made in countries due to 
growing demand, the main purpose is to obtain a better access to those markets. Therefore, the number 
of retail and distribution divisions is increasingly recognized as an important variable in strategies for the 
international competitiveness. For example, both Korean and Japanese automobile manufactures 
compete in the Indian market (lured by an annual growth rate of 20%) via increasing distribution and 
retail divisions.
6
 In the literature, however, such kinds of strategic aspects of the number of divisions 
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(i.e., divisionalization decisions) have been downplayed. 
In this note, we argue that in the presence of divisionalization decisions, cross-country cost 
differentials affect FDI outcomes because of the changed competition structure. To illustrate this point, 
we consider a simple international differentiated duopoly environment in which two parent firms from 
different countries compete in the third country’s market.
7
 We assume that there are cross-country cost 
differentials between these two parent firms which produce differentiated products. The parent firms’ 
choices of divisionalization are modeled as a two-stage game.
8
 It will be shown that the number of third 
market divisions of a parent firm with a cost advantage (i.e., lower marginal costs) is relatively large. 
The results imply that the cost advantage of one country's firm will be magnified through 
divisionalization decisions. 
In these mode of competition, the number of divisions plays an important role as a strategic 
variable: through changing the number of its division, each parent firm can affect its strategic position in 
the third market. As yet, however, little attention has been paid to the implications of divisionalization in 
the context of competition in the international market. Since the role of divisionalization is amplified in 
the globalized world, it seems important to explore the relationship between cost-competitiveness and 
divisionalization in the open economy setting. 
As its primary contribution, this note examines how comparative advantage (i.e., the 
cost-competitiveness of the parent firm) affects divisionalization decisions in the third country’s market.  
 
 
2． The Model 
 
Consider a model with two parent firms, each of which belongs to its country (labeled Home and 
Foreign). Parent firms intend to make foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions in regard to a third 
market.
9
 We assume that output is differentiated across firms and that the inverse demand functions of 
Home and Foreign product in the third market are given by 
 
)10(),(and)(      QQpQQp  （１） 
 
where p  (
p ) and Q  (
Q ) denote the price and the total output of Home (Foreign) product 
respectively, and   is a parameter indicating the degree of product differentiation. A FDI game is 
modeled as a simultaneous-move, two-stage game among profit-maximizing parent firms. In the first 
stage, each parent firm chooses a number of competing units in the third country, which we will 
henceforth call ‘divisions’. In the second stage, all of these divisions are independent Cournot-Nash 
players in a simultaneous-move, differentiated product oligopoly game in the third market. Let n  ( n ) 
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denote the number of divisions chosen by the Home (Foreign) parent firm in the first stage and let x  
( y ) be the output of each division of the Home (Foreign) firm. The cost of adding another division, 
0f , is constant and identical for both parent firms. It is assumed that there are cross-country cost 
differentials between two countries’ divisions. We normalize the Home divisions’ marginal cost zero, 
while c  ( 0c ) represents the Foreign divisions’ marginal costs. 
We can solve for the second-stage Cournot equilibrium outputs as a function of the number of 
divisions chosen in the first stage. Given the number of divisions, the equilibrium output of each division 
and the equilibrium prices become
10
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where )1)(1(1),(   uvvuvu . Note that, due to cross-country cost differentials, each 
Home division produces more than each Foreign division (i.e., yx   ), as long as )1/(*   c . 
We can write the profit for the Home (Foreign) parent firm as  
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In the first stage, each parent firm chooses the number of divisions in the third market, taking as 
given the divisionalization decisions of its rival. Differentiating (6) and (7) with respect to the number of 
divisions, setting the result to zero yields the following reaction functions for each parent firm.
11
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
 QQx   while each Foreign division’s profit is 
])([   

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
, respectively. 
 
11Subscripts denote partial derivatives throughout. It is straightforward to check that the second-order conditions are met. 
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The comparative statics effects )/(
dcdn  and )/(
 dcdn  can be obtained by totally differentiating 
these conditions with respect to n , n , and c  as follows: 
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These equations can be solved as  
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where 

  nnnnnnnnD
. Given the assumption that n  and n  are strategic substitutes (i.e., 
0 nn
 and )0nn
 as defined by Bulow et al. (1985), we can obtain that 0)/( dcdn  and 
0)/(  dcdn .12 
Figure 1 illustrates a generic equilibrium for this model. RF (RF
*
) denotes Home (Foreign) 
parent firm’s reaction curves: equilibrium numbers of divisions are obtained at the intersection of these 
curves. Note that an increase in c  shifts RF (RF
*
) outward (inward), as indicated by dotted curves. 
This leads to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition: In the differentiated duopoly game in the international (third) market, the parent firm with 
the lowest marginal costs will have the largest number of divisions. 
 
This implies that the cost-advantaged firm’s divisions will dominate in the third market: not 
only does each division with a cost advantage produce a larger output ( yx  ), but also the number of 
such divisions becomes larger in the third market (  nn ). The principle involved is that, since the 
motivation for divisionalization is to commit to a higher output level in the product market, a 
cost-advantaged Home parent firm (which has a higher incentive to shift profits) will choose a larger 
                                                   
12This assumption holds and a stable equilibrium with 0D  exists when (i) 

c  is sufficiently small, (ii)   is close to 
1, and (iii) 
2/12/1
))(2/33()(   fcf  

 is satisfied. Regarding condition (iii), we add some comments. This can 
be viewed as conditions on the size of market. Firstly, if the former inequality doesn’t hold the market is so small that 
Foreign firm with a cost disadvantage is impossible to enter this market, even if there is no Home firm’s division in the 
market. Secondly, the later inequality doesn’t hold the market is not so small that Home firm with a cost advantage 
increases their divisions in response to an increase in the number of Foreign firm’s division when it is sufficiently small: 
The slope of RF becomes positive close to the horizontal axis (Figure 1). Indeed, the later one is not necessary to obtain 
our result, since we only need to assume that n  and 

n  becomes strategic substitutes around a generic equilibrium. 
 
number of divisions in the first stage.
13
 
 
 
3． Conclusion 
 
In a two-stage differentiated duopoly game with divisionalization, it has been shown that a cost 
advantage for a country’s parent firm will result in a relatively large number of divisions in the third 
market. In other words, given that FDI is liberalized, an initial cost-advantage of one country will be 
magnified through divisionalization decisions. 
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